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PRODUCT LIABILITY OF THE 1980s: "REPOSE
IS NOT THE DESTINY" OF
MANUFACTURERS
TERRY MoREHEAD DwoRKINt
In response to the growing number ofproduct liability suits and

dramatic rises in insurancepremiums, many state legislatureswerepersuadedto enact statutes ofrepose. Adopted under thepressureexerted
by the lobbiesof specialinterestgroups,the statutesofrepose standas a
form ofspecial legislationthat in effect denies the existence of a duty
between a de/endant andpotentialplaintiffafter a specyfed number of
years. In the context of the delayed manifestation injury, Professor
Dworkin argues that the time bar set by the statutes ofrepose may be
succesifully avoidedby severalmeans: distinguishingbetween old-product injury and delayedmanfestation cases, tollingthe statute oflimitationsperiod, and challenging the constitutional validity of the repose
statutes on equalprotection and dueprocess grounds. Although comprehensivelegislative action addressingthe specialproblemsofdelayed
manifestationinjury wouldbepreferred,the courts arelikely to counteract the harsh effects of the statutes of repose by emphasizing the rights
ofplaintiffs injuredby technologicallydeectiveproducts.
"Certainty generally is an illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man."'
Neither does repose appear to be the destiny of manufacturers. Despite recent
legislation designed to give manufacturers repose from product liability, many
factors indicate that these statutes will not afford the certainty sought.
Repose statutes were a response to the upheaval in product liability law of
the 1970s. 2 As consumerism swelled, injured parties gained greater awareness
of their rights, and courts facilitated suits by wider adoption of theories such as
strict liability3 and expansion of traditional tort theories. 4 This development
in turn led to an escalation in the number of suits brought against manufacturt Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. A.B. Stanford University 1964;
J.D. Indiana University-Bloomington.
1. 3. BARTLETT, FAMuAR QUOTATIONS 787 (14th ed. 1968) (quoting O.W. HOLMES, THE
PATH OF THE LAW (1897)).
2. See, eg., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD. LIAB., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILrrY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY (1977); Epstein, Products Liability: The
Searchfor the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REv. 643 (1978); Phillips, .4Synopsis of the Developing
Law of ProductsLiability, 28 DRAKE L. Rnv. 317 (1978-79); Schwartz, Foreword- Understanding
ProductsLiability, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 435 (1979).
3. Strict product liability was first adopted in 1963 in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897,27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Its wide adoption was fostered by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), and it is now recognized in some form in virtually every
jurisdiction.
4. The abrogation of the patent danger rule in some jurisdictions is one example. See, e.g.,
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ers, and in the number and amounts of awards. 5 Insurers, reacting in part to
this situation and to open-ended liability, raised premiums for product liability insurance by hundreds and sometimes thousands of percent. 6 A feeling of
crisis permeated the business and insurance world, and in the latter half of the

decade these groups exerted their considerable influence to effect legislative
changes to counteract these trends. 7 As a result, product liability reform statutes have been passed by a majority of states,8 and passage of a federal bill
may be forthcoming. 9 These acts feature statutes of repose as the primary
Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1978); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,
348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
Another example is the adoption of the Wade-Keeton test, which measures the reasonableness of a manufacturer's actions by standards at the time of trial and not at the time design and
marketing decisions were made. See, e.g., Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 34 Ill.
App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276
(1975); Keeton, ProductLiability andthe Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.L.J. 5 (1965).
5. There were 50,000 product liability suits in 1960, and over 1,000,000 by 1976. NATIONAL
LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, PRE-CONFERENCE "WoRKING PAPERS" OF RICHARD

BIEDER 4 (Apr. 1982).
6. Note, Wen the ProductTicks: ProductsLiability and Statutes of Limitations, I1 IND. L.
Rav. 693, 698-99 (1978).
7. The American Insurance Association was one of the groups that sought change through
its PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE: STATUTES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE FAIRNESS
AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW (American Ins. Ass'n, 1977). See Note, The

ProposedProduct Liability Statute in Ohio-It's Purposeand ProbableResults, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 141, 144 n.14 (1980). Suggested changes included a statute of repose and a state-of-the-art
defense. Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New Immunity for Product Suppliers,
656 INS. LJ.535 (1977).
8. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp.
1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11 (1982); IDAHO CODE
§ [6-1403] 6-1303 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982);
IND. CODE ANN. § [34-4-20A-5] 33-1-1.5-1 (Burns Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b)
(1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Baldwin 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. Stat. § 30.905 (1981); I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (Supp.
1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1982). See also
McGovern, The Status of StatutesofLimitations andStatutesofRepose in ProductLiabilityActionsx
Presentand Future, 16 FoRuM 416, 425 (1981).
9. The Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981 was enacted in Congress on September
25, 1981. Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949 (1981). The Act allows manufacturers to operate selfinsurance groups on a nationwide basis. In addition, federal tort reform of the product liability
laws is being considered. Nationwide reform is urged by some commentators because of the inconsistencies in the laws and statutory changes from state to state. ProductsLiability, 67 A.B.A. J.
1253 (1981). On October 15, 1981, the Senate Commerce Consumer Subcommittee unveiled a
draft bill designed to promote uniformity roughly along the lines of the MODEL UNIF. PROD.
LLAs. ACT, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979), and asked for public comments. Amended
after public comment, the proposed Act is soon to be introduced in the Senate. ProductsLiabiliy,
68 A.B.A. J. 399 (1982). It is supported by the Product Liability Alliance, a group of approximately 150 organizations including the Business Roundtable, the American Insurance Association, and the National Association of Manufacturers. The Alliance is represented by Victor
Schwartz, former chairman of the Task Force that drafted the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act. The proposal would establish probusiness policies, such as requiring plaintiff to prove defendant manufactured the injury-causing product (thus overruling Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (market share liability theory), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980), a presumption in favor of the safety of the product if it meets federal standards,
and shifting the burden of proof from product manufacturers and distributors to consumers. A
similar bill has also been introduced in the House. H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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vehicle for alleviating the problem of extended liability. 10
Concurrent with this legislative trend has been the continuing, countervailing common-law trend to increase manufacturers' liability. A key factor in
this increase has been the expansion of liability for widespread, time-delayed
product injuries.' 1 Time-delayed injury suits may well come to dominate tort
litigation of the 1980s,12 and for some manufacturers such liability will far
exceed that which was threatened in the Seventies. Since the injury in this

type of suit usually manifests itself after the repose period statutorily established by the new statutes, 13 an increasingly important question is whether
these statutes will be interpreted to time-bar such suits.
This article will examine the proconsumer trends such as market share

liability and corporate successor liability, recent developments regarding stat10. These statutes are seen as a solution for several reasons: they would solve the "long tail"
or open-ended liability problem and thereby help stabilize insurance rates; they would prevent the
us- of time-of-trial standards to judge products several years after their development and manufacture, see supra note 4 and accompanying text; Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in
ProductsLiability, 69 CALiF. L. REv. 919 (1981); Phillips, An Anaysis ofProosedeformofProducts LiabilityStatutes ofLimitations, 56 N.C.L. Rav. 663, 665 (1978), and they would preclude a
small number of suits involving some of the most seriously injured plaintiffs. Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law---A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV.
221, 244 (1978-1979).
11. See, e.g., White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1037 (1982) (asbestos); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 980 (1982) ("agent orange"); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (asbestos); Sindel v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Bichler
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981) (DES); Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424
Pa. 140,226 A.2d 87 (1966) (beryllium); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 53, 289 N.W.2d 20
(1980) (DES); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980)

(DES).
12. There are estimated to be over 1,000 pending DES suits, and the number is growing as
more of the estimated three million DES daughters bring suit. Lawscope-Toxic Time Bombs, 67
A.B.A. J. 139, 140 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability:An Answer to the DES CausationProblem,
94 HARv. L. REV. 668, 668 n.7 (1981). In addition, DES has been linked to decreased fertility in
sons of mothers who took the drug. CommentDES andaProposedTheory ofEnterpriseLiability,
46 FoRDRAM L. REv. 963, 964 n.5 (1978). The number of asbestos-related suits is even greater.
There are estimated to be 25,000 suits pending, and that number is estimated to be growing by six
hundred per month per manufacturer, of which there are more than two dozen. Masters,Asbestos
LiabilitySuits Strain Manufacturers, Court System, Legal Times, Mar. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2. The
growth will be even greater as a result of the decision in White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d
234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1037 (1982), which allowed seamen and shipyard
workers to sue under admiralty law and thereby avoid time bars in many states. In addition, it
was recently discovered that a significant number of spouses and children contracted asbestiosis
from contact with the clothing, skin, and hair of shipyard workers. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 4, 1981,
§ 2, at 9, col. 1 (citing a study released by the American Lung Association). Agent Orange plaintiffs are estimated to number 50,000 or more. Lawscope-Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. "139
(1981).
Suiis based on toxic waste, radiation injuries (such as those from the Bikini and Eniwetok
atolls tests), microwaves (see infra note 73), and various drugs and chemicals whose harmful effects are just becoming known will greatly increase the numbers.
13. The repose periods range from five years to twelve years, but the majority of states have
adopted a ten-year period. Dworkin, Product Liability Reform and the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act, 60 NEB. L. REV. 50, 68 & n.127 (1981). In DES cases, for example, the injury
generally does not manifest itself until at least ten to twenty years after the mother's ingestion of
the drug. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 589, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 133, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), and in asbestiosis a similar time lag can occur.
Granelli, The Asbestos Case Explosion, Natl L.J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
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utes of limitations and statutes of repose, and the likely results when these
conflicting common-law and legislative trends meet in the context of timedelayed product injuries. Public policy issues, as reflected in decisions based
on constitutionality, duty, estoppel, and tolling or suspension of the running of
the limitations period, indicate that many courts will not find the statutes to be
a bar.
I.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS TRENDS

The recognition and protection of a repose interest is not new.14 It has
long been conceded that some time limitation on the ability to bring suit is
necessary if practicality as well as justice are to be served.1 5 Defendants at
some point should be able to institute financial plans with certainty, free from
the threat of stale claims; plaintiffs, if truly aggrieved, should pursue remedies
within a reasonable period of time; and defendants and courts should not have
to deal with cases in which the passage of time seriously hampers the search
for truth.' 6 For the traditional statute of limitations, the legislature balances
the interests of the parties in light of these considerations, and determines that
at some point the right to be free from stale claims must prevail over the right
to prosecute them.1 7 This determination is usually made to cover a wide class
of actions, such as torts, or to encompass similarly situated parties.
The conflict between a plaintiffs interest in bringing suit and a defendant's repose interest has been most sharply highlighted by cases in which the
plaintiff has been injured but does not discover the injury, or does not discover
the connection between the injury and the action causing it, until after the
period set by the legislature has run. Interpretation of the statutes of limitations to bar such suits has not been consistent, but in the first half of the twentieth century courts generally put greater emphasis on the repose interest and
strictly construed the statutes by starting the limitations period at the time of
the incident causing the injury.' 8 Thus, the plaintiffs suit was denied if discovery of the injury took place after the statutorily defined period.' 9 This
strict interpretation has gradually given way to a rule that focuses upon the
actual time of discovery of injury. Such a rule now exists in some form in
14. The first tort statute of limitations in 1623 provided for a six-year limitations period "after the cause of such actions or suit." 21 Jac. I.C. 16 (1623).
15. "Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in
logic. . . . They represent a public policy about the. privilege to litigate." Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). See also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944); Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1869);
I.H. WooD, A TREATIsE ON THE LImrrATIONS OF AcTIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 9 (2d ed.
1893).
16. See, eg., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979); Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp.,
508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
17. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. at 349.
18. Note, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177 (1950).
19. See, ag., Riley v. United States, 212 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1954); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934); Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 277 P.2d 724

(1954).
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most jurisdictions when personal injuries are involved. 20 Under this interpretation, the statutory period begins to run when the injury is or should reasonably have been discovered, not when the alleged tort is committed.
This "discovery rule" was first widely adopted in medical malpractice
cases in which a foreign object was left in the patient's body. In these cases the
limitations period is short (generally one or two years), the nature of the injury
often prevents the plaintiff from quickly discovering what is wrong, and he or
she often is forced to rely on the defendant's statements. 2 1 The courts determined that under these circumstances plaintiffs should not be denied their
right to sue. The discovery rule has now been adopted in many other tort
areas, the courts having concluded that the equities involved in nonmedical
cases are essentially the same as those present in the medical malpractice
situation. 2
Increasingly, the trend toward favoring a plaintiffs right to bring suit for
personal injury has been furthered by adoption of a causal-connection-accrual
rule. Under this rule, counting for the limitations period does not begin until
the plaintiff discovers both the injury and that defendant has caused it, and in
some instances, not until the plaintiff also discovers he or she has a cause of
23
action.
In a strictly commercial setting, in which damages are economic, courts
have been more reluctant to adopt a discovery rule, and repose interests are
emphasized. 24 Stability and predictability are considered crucial in the busi20. See, ag., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274
Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 30, at 144 (4th ed. 1971).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comment e (1965).
22. See, e.g., Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1980); Louisville Trust Co. v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Ky. 1979); Frederick v. Calbio
Pharmaceuticals, 89 Cal. App. 3d 49, 152 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1979).
23. See, eg., Goodman v. Meade Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 828 (1976); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Frederick v.
Calbio Pharmaceuticals, 89 Cal. App. 3d 49, 152 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1979). Contra United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). In Kubrick the Court, in deciding whether the two-year limitation
period of the Federal Tort Claims Act began to run at the time plaintiff became aware of injury or
when plaintiff discovered a negligence connection, differentiated between those cases in which
plaintiff is ignorant of his injury and its cause and those in which he is ignorant of his legal rights.
When the plaintiff is ignorant of his injury, the facts about causation may be in the defendant's
control or very difficult to obtain and therefore accrual should not begin until this knowledge is
obtained. Mere ignorance of legal rights does not stop the period from running from discovery of
injury caused by the defendant since the plaintiff, upon discovery, is no longer at defendant's
mercy. Cf. O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981) (limitations period began to
run when plaintiff learned she had cancer five years earlier and not three years later when she
discovered her mother had taken DES; mother had previously denied taking the drug and her
doctor had said the relationship between her cancer and the drug was unclear).
24. See, ag., Durant v. Grange Silo Co., 12 A.D.2d 694, 207 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1960); Smith v.
Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 101 Tex. 24, 102 S.W. 908 (1907). Emphasis on repose also has occurred
in legal malpractice suits in which the damages are only economic. In a recent decision, Shideler
v. Dwyer, - Ind. -, 417 N.E.2d 281 (1981), the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs suit
for malpractice in drafting a will constituted a claim of injury to personal property and arose
when the death of the testator occurred, not when the probate court decreed that the gift to the
plaintiff was void. Since plaintiff brought suit after discovering the injury when the gift was denied more than two years after the death of the testator, the two-year limitations period barred
suit. But see Anderson v. Neal, 428 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1981) (unreasonable and unfair to bar redress
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ness context if commerce is to thrive. This repose preference is reflected in the
limitations period generally adopted by the states from the Uniform Commercial Code, which bars suits brought more than four years after the sale of the
product in question. 25 Here too, however, when personal injury results from a
commercial transaction, courts have tended to deemphasize repose and opt for
a plaintiffs right to bring suit. When personal injury is caused by a product,
most courts have construed the suit to be a tort action rather than a warranty
action under the U.C.C., and have allowed the tort accrual-from-discovery
26
rule to prevail.
This preference for a plaintiffs right to sue was carried over into the construction of limitations statutes for strict liability. Since strict liability theory
draws from both tort and warranty law, the use of either the four-year statute
of repose of the U.C.C. or the tort discovery limitations period would have
been supportable. Most jurisdictions, however, have favored the plaintiffs interests over repose interests and have applied the tort time-of-discovery limitation. 27 Thus, discovery accrual has often been used in delayed manifestation
28
suits, which are increasingly based on strict liability.
A recent case that demonstrates the degree to which courts are willing to
stretch the discovery rule to accommodate a plaintiffs delayed manifestation
product liability suit is Ferrerv. Richardson-Merrell,29 decided in 1980 by the
California Court of Appeal. Plaintiff, a doctor, self-prescribed MER/29 in
March 1960. A few months later he was unable to read, suffered severe dermatitis, was unable to work for four to six weeks, and suffered some permanent eye damage. 30 Plaintiff knew that these reactions were "likely" related to
the MER/29 and discontinued its use. In 1976 he developed cataracts, and at
that time filed suit against the drug manufacturer.31 The California limitations period is one year.32 Citing "straws in the wind," such as special limitations rules in nuisance and progressive occupational disease cases 33 and
of potentially catastrophic economic loss before client reasonably should have discovered it);
Ameraccount Club, Inc. v. Hill, 617 S.W.2d 876 (Tenn. 1981) (no bar of recovery for economic
loss before client discovered it).
25. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1972).
26. See, g., Brown v. Merrow Mach. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Conn. 1976); Kinney v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 134 Vt. 571, 367 A.2d 677 (1976). In Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975), the court chose the tort statute of limitations over the
warranty statute even though plaintiff was thereby barred from iuit. The majority stressed that it
was the type of harm incurred, not the type of liability that was involved, which controlled. See
also Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
27. See, eg., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Victorsen v.

Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
28. See, eg., Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky.
1979); Wigginton v. Reichold Chems., Inc., 133 Ill. App. 2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118 (1971). See also
Birnbaum, 'First Breath's"Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in ProductsLiability Cases, 13 FORUM

279, 285 (1977).
29. 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980).

30. Id at 319, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
31. Id

32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (West Supp. 1982).
33. In nuisance cases, when it is not clear whether the nuisance is permanent or temporary,
plaintiff can elect to prosecute either claim and will not be met by a plea of merger if he or she
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currently developing merger exceptions of res judicata,3 4 the court found that
plaintiff should be able to split his cause of action and sue for the cataract
damage, especially since he did not claim that the 1960 troubles were MER/29
related. 35 Accrual would begin not when plaintiff first suffered serious damage and knew the cause, but sixteen years later when he suffered further damage. "The simple fact is that rules developed against the relatively
unsophisticated backdrops of barroom brawls, intersection collisions and slips
and falls lose some of their relevance in these days of miracle drugs with their
unintended, unanticipated and frequently long-delayed side
wondrous,
36
effects."
The equitable reasoning behind these changes clearly expresses this and
other courts' greater concern for a plaintiffs right to bring suit than for a defendant's repose interests. If a plaintiff has been blameless in failing to discover the injury, then justice requires that the suit be allowed. The statute of
limitations is construed to require only that the plaintiff act within a reason37
able time after discovering that his or her rights have been invaded. In opting for a tort discovery approach, courts have emphasized the rights of
innocent plaintiffs and safety considerations, 38 as compared to the interests of
incorrectly treated a permanent nuisance as temporary. Plaintiff can therefore bring successive
actions if the nuisance is permanent. Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 239 P.2d 625 (1952).
34. Section 26(l)(f) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982) lists "extraordinary reason" and a prior judgment that is "plainly inconsistent with the fair and equitable implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme" as exceptions to the general rule against
splitting causes of action.
35. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 321, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
36. Id at 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595. See also Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d
566 (3d Cir. 1976). Cf Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1981)
(worker diagnosed as having mild asbestiosis in 1973 allowed to bring wrongful death suit in 1980
despite three-year statute of limitations because the court construed the bronchogenic carcinoma
to be an independent disease, and not a maturation of the harm from exposure to asbestos diagnosed in 1973).
A recent lower court attempt to extend wrongful death and survival action statutes of limitations, however, was overturned on appeal. In Anthony v. Koppers Co., 284 Pa. Super. 81, 425
A.2d 428 (1980), the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that decedents suffered injury after their
death by construing the statute to begin running when decedents' representatives could reasonably
discover the causal connection between the deaths and defendant's coke oven emissions. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, - Pa. -, 436 A.2d 181 (1981), refused to apply the discovery rule
in wrongful death limitations, and literally construed the statute, which allowed suit "within one
year after the death, and not thereafter." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1603 (Purdon 1953) repealedby
tit. 42, § 5524(2) (Purdon 1981). Accord Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp., 520 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.
Tex. 1981). In Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., No. 80-L-52 (McLean County Ct., Ill.,
Feb. 26, 1981), the state's two-year statute of limitations (which barred husband's asbestiosis suit)
was in effect avoided when a wife was allowed to recover $125,000 in compensatory damages and
$375,000 in punitive damages for loss of consortium caused by her husband's illness. The consortium statute of limitations is six years.
37. In interpreting the accrual time of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Supreme
Court in Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), stated:
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences [barring the
suit] to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion
of legal rights.
Id at 170. See also Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977).
38. See, eg., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
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defendants who were responsible for their products, 39 limited expectations of
defendants concerning repose,4° and stale evidence. 41 Many of the same considerations have prompted the courts to expand or adapt traditional tort theories to facilitate delayed manifestation suits when the delay has caused nonstatute of limitations problems in bringing suit.
II.

PRODUCT LIABILITY TRENDS

An example of this facilitation to overcome time-related problems can be
seen in recent DES decisions. 42 DES, or diethylstilbestrol, is a drug that was
generically prescribed between 1941 and 1971 for the prevention of miscarriages. 43 The medication causes cancer and precancerous growths in daughters of the ingesters a minimum of ten to twelve years after ingestion. ' "
Because of the delayed manifestation of injury and the generic nature of the
drug, which permitted pharmacists to fill doctors' prescriptions and refills with
whatever was on hand, 45 plaintiffs were unable to identify which of the over
200 DES manufacturers produced the drug that injured them.46 Recently,
39. See, e.g., Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 324, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 591 (1980); Anthony v. Koppers Co., 284 Pa. Super. 81, 425 A.2d 428 (1980).
40. The implication is that if one markets a product, especially drugs and chemicals, the
long-range effects of which are unknown because they result from rapid advances in science or
technology, one cannot expect repose interests to intercede and cut off liability after a brief time.
Marketing of the drug or chemical implies long-range responsibility:
The harmful propensities of drugs are often not fully known at the time the drugs are
marketed. These companies know or at least should expect that some time may pass
before the harmful effects of their products manifest themselves in drug users and that
there may be another lapse of time before the injured person is able to discover the
causal connection ....
Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 171, 371 A.2d 170, 176 (1977). See also MartinezFerrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 318, 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (1980).
41. Since businesses are expected to keep records, and are in the best position to collect information regarding the safety and performance of their products, the problem of stale evidence is
assumed to have less of an impact on the commercial defendant. Martinez-Ferrer v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596; Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H.
164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Birnbaum, supra note 28, at 290.
42. See supra note 11.
43. Diethylstilbestrol is a synthetic female hormone developed in England in 1937 as a chemical substitute for estrogen. See generally PHYSICIAN s' DESK REFERENCE 1099 (36th ed. 1982);

Krol, Intra-IndustryJoint LIability: The Era of4bsolute Products Liability, 687 INS. L.J. 185
(1980). There is also evidence that the drug might have been given to pregnant women to promote
a healthier baby in a normal pregnancy. Note, Diethylstilbestrok Extension ofFederalClass 4ction Proceduresto GenericDrug Litigation, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 461, 464 (1980).
44. See PHYsIcIANs' DESK REFERENCE 1099 (36th ed. 1982). DES causes adenocarcinoma, a
fast-spreading cancer, in approximately one to four per 1,000 DES daughters. Usual treatment
includes a hysterectomy and removal of the vagina. Between 30 to 90% of DES daughters suffer
from adenosis, or precancerous vaginal and cervical growths which can spread to other body
areas. The condition requires close monitoring by biopsy or colposcopic examination, and treatment includes cauterization, surgery, or cryosurgery. DES has been linked to reduced fertility in
males. Comment, DES anda ProposedTheory ofEnterpriseLiability, 46 FoRDHri L. REv. 963,
964 n.5 (1978).
45. Note, supra note 43. An additional source ofconfusion arises because some drug companies that manufactured DES sold it to other companies that in turn sold it under their own labels.
Note, CaliforniaExpands Tort Liability Underthe Novel "'MarketShare" Theory: Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories,8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1011, 1011 n.1 (1981).
46. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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courts have started allowing these suits despite the inability to identify the
specific manufacturer, rather than nonsuiting on the causation question as
they previously had done.47
The California Supreme Court made the most important and controversial change in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,Inc. 48 In Sindell the court expanded the earlier ground-breaking precedent of Summers v. Tice 49 by
adopting the theory of market share liability. Under this theory, if a plaintiff
joins enough defendants so that together defendants had a "substantial share"
of the relevant market, the burden of proof is shifted to the defendants to show
that they, individually, did not produce the drug that injured the plaintiff.50
Since defendants have no better information than plaintiffs, they generally are
unable to meet this burden. The court held that this shift was fair, however,
because defendants who were responsible for marketing the drug have to pay
only a percentage of the judgement proportionate to their share of the market.5 1 Other courts recently
have reached similar results, although not neces52
sarily by the same theory.
Another time-related change in products liability law designed to facilitate plaintiffs' suits is the recent liberalization of corporate successor liability
in some jurisdictions. Traditionally a successor corporation did not assume
the debts or liabilities, including tort-related liabilities, of the corporation it
purchased if all assets were transferred free of fraud and no provision was
made for the successor corporation to do so. 53 In 1977 California broke with
tradition by adopting the "product line" approach, allowing the successor cor47. See, eg., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McCreery v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978).
48. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
49. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (since defendant hunters negligently shot in plaintiffs
direction, and plaintiff was without fault, burden of proof shifted to defendants to show which of

them had not hit plaintiff). California has long been a leader in shifting burdens of proof to
accommodate plaintiffs suit. See, eg., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
In Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 CaL 3d 413,432, 573 P.2d 443,456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978),
the court continued its proplaintiff product liability trend by creating a two-pronged test by which
a plaintiff can prove a product defective in design. If a plaintiff fails to meet the threshold "ordinary consumer expectations" test,, plaintiff may still prevail if defendant manufacturer is unable to
show that the benefits of the design outweigh the risks inherent in the design.
50. "Substantial" market share is not defined. The court specifically refused to adopt the 75
to 80% figure used in the law review that proposed the theory. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937,
113 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See Comment, DES and a ProposedTheory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FoRDHAm L. REv. 963, 996 (1978). Also undefined are the market area, the time period in which
the market share is to be determined, and the uses for which the production in the market definition was sold.
51. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46.
52. See, eg., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D. 2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981) (concert of
action theory); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 53, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979) (alternative
liability and concert of action); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305
(Law. Div. 1980) (alternative liability with market share theory overtones). Contra Payton v.
Abbott Laboratories, 512 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1981) (no concert of action or joint venture);
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981) (no concert of action, alternative liability, enterprise liability, or market share liability).
53. See, ag., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Ortiz v. South
Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975). See also 15 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR'ORATXONS § 7122, at 188 (1973).
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poration to be sued in strict liability for a product it did not produce if that
product was in the same product line as the one the successor corporation was
now manufacturing. 54 A primary reason cited by the court for changing the
law was that plaintiffs otherwise would be remedyless because their recourse
against the predecessor was virtually extinguished by the acquisition.-- In addition, the successor had the ability to assume the risk-spreading role and
56
purchased the risk along with the good will of the predecessor.
New Jersey recently followed California's lead and adopted this theory in
Ramirez v. Amsted Industries 7 The New JerseyeSupreme Court used the
product line concept to allow suit by a plaintiff injured by a power press manufactured in 1948 or 1949. In another case decided the same day the court
expanded the concept by allowing suit against an intermediate successor cor58
poration who was no longer producing the line, but was still in business.
Pennsylvania adopted the Ramirez product iine formulation because it imple-

mented "the social policies underlying strict product liability."59
In explaining the reasons for facilitating plaintiffs' suits in these circumstances courts again have emphasized the innocence of plaintiffs, who would
otherwise be left remedyless, as compared to the responsibility of defendants

for marketing the product, spreading costs, 60 and promoting safety,6 1 as well
as the relative unimportance of stale evidence. 62 These are essentially the

same considerations that initially prompted many courts to adopt strict product liability,63 and the facilitation of claims represents a continuation of that
pro-plaintiff/consumer trend. The new statutes of repose fly in the face of this
trend.
III.

STATUTES OF REPOSE

Modem statutes of repose differ from the conventional statutes of limita54. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
55. 1d at 31-33, 560 P.2d at 8-10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-81.
56. Id at 33-34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
57. 86 NJ. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
58. Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
59. Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, -, 434 A.2d 106, 111 (1981). The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to extend the
Daweko decision to cover a manufacturer who had acquired the right to the predecessor's name,
patents, trademarks, company records, and engineering drawings, but had not acquired the predecessor's physical plant and machinery, which were purchased by a different company. The predecessor corporation was dissolved. Savini v. Kent Mach. Works, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa.
1981). See also Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982) (court refused to adopt the
product-line theory primarily because it could financially destroy small companies).
60. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 NJ. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law. Div. 1980).
61. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 144. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 NJ. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
62. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cer. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
63. See, eg., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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tions because they heavily emphasize the repose interest in order to protect a
special class of potential litigants. They set a definite accrual time unrelated to
discovery of injury, and in essence deny that the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff after a specific number of years.64 In product liability repose statutes,
for example, it is the age of the product, not the timeliness of the plaintiffs
actions, that is the focus of the statute, and suit often is barred before injury
occurs. 6 5 Rather than following the balance struck by the courts between a
plaintiffs right to sue and a defendant's repose interests, the legislatures, at the
request of and under pressure from special interest groups, have chosen to
protect defendants in order to solve a perceived crisis in various segments of
the economy.66 Such statutes have been passed to protect architects and build-

ers, 67 and health care providers, 68 as well as sellers of products.
Architects' and builders' repose statutes were the first passed and were
generally upheld. 69 This success offered support for the passage of similar
64. See, eg., Massery, supra note 7, at 541; McGovern, supra note 8, at 419.

65. The repose period is generally measured from the time the product is sold or delivered to

the initial user. See, ag., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § [34-4-20A-5]
33-1-1.5-5 (Burns Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (Supp. 1981). Other accrual periods are
used, however. See, ag., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin 1981) (five years from date of
manufacture); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977) (six years from sale to consumer or ten years

from date of manufacture). Since products, especially capital goods, can and sometimes do cause
injury more than ten years after the product is sold, delivered, or manufactured, suit based on
such injury is barred.
In delayed manifestation cases discovery does not usually occur until after the running of the
period. Therefore, these types of suits also are potentially barred. See supra note 13.
66. Note, supra note 6, at 694; Note, Various Risk Allocation Schemes Under the Model Uniform Product LiabilityAct: AnAnaysis ofthe Statute of Repose, ComparativeFaultPrinciples,and
the Conflicting Social PoliciesArisingfrom Workplace Product Injuries, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
588, 589 (1980).
67. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (1973); AiK. STAT. ANN. § 37-237 (Supp. 1981);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-51 (1982); HAwAi REv. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 5-241
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (1976); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (Baldwin 1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2772 (West Supp. 1982);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5839 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West Supp.
1982); MIss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (1972); NEv. REv. STAT. § 11.205 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 508:4-b (1968); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West Cum. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-127 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (Supp. 1981); N.D. CErr. CODE § 28-01-44 (1974); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § [2305.13.1] 2305.131 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 109 (West Supp.
1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-9 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-202 (1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West 1973) repealed by
§ 893.89 (West Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-111 (Supp. 1982).
68. See, eg., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584
(West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (West 1982); HAwAii REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (1976);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-212 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns
Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(9) (West 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(7) (1976);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.020 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.350 (Supp. 1982).
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974); Agus v. Future
Chattanooga Dev. Corp., 358 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark.
1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appealdismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Reeves v. Mhe Elec. Co., 170

Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662
(1972); Howellv. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3,569 P.2d 413
(1977); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978); Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974);
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medical malpractice legislation, but increasingly the statutes protecting health
care providers, as well as those protecting architects and builders, have failed
to withstand challenge. 70 The product liability statutes of repose, the latest
legislative time control effort, are even more likely to meet with failure in the
courts, especially when challenged in the context of7 1delayed manifestation
suits, despite the assumptions of most commentators.
Several indications support this assumption. The strong pro-plaintiff/consumer bias, which has led to the wide adoption of strict liability, the
expansion of theories to facilitate delayed manifestation suits, and the application of discovery-of-harm accrual for statutes of limitations, has already been
discussed. These trends and biases will not easily be set aside by the courts,
especially when it is not clear that the legislators had delayed manifestation
cases in mind when the repose statutes were enacted, when there is less of a
crisis than originally feared, and when the statutes, which are special legislation, 72 change substantive rights but may not alleviate the problem. In addition, although statutes of repose affect a relatively static number of people
injured by architects, builders, and health care providers, many new types of
product-caused delayed manifestation injuries are discovered yearly. 73 The
Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d
2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
108 (1972). But see Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.
70. Architects' and builders' statutes were held unconstitutional in: Bagby Elevator & Elec.
Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d
572 (Fla. 1979); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218
(Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yeager, Inc. 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977);
Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck,
270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225
N.W.2d 454 (1975); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980). California created
judicial exceptions to its statute and thereby sustained it. Regents v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624, 581 P.2d 197, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1978).
Parts or all of several states' medical malpractice legislation have been overturned on a variety of grounds. See, eg., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (posting bond);
Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (review panel); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp.
2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (review panel); State ex rel Cardinal Glennon MemoAss'n, 63 IlL
rial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); Linder v. Smith, 629
P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981) (limitation on evidence); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825
(1980) (statute of repose among eight of Act's ten provisions invalidated); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (limitation on damages); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190
(1980) (arbitration panels); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 104 Cal. App. 3d
219, 163 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1980) (damages award provision); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,
3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976) (compulsory arbitration: limitation on damages);
Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976) (limitations on damages). Cf.
Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977).
71. See, Cg., MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. AcT § 110 analysis, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,
62,734 (1979); Berns & Lykos, Sindell v. Abbott Labs- "lheHeirof the Citadel," 15 FORUM 1031,
1039 (1980); Johnson, ProductsLiabili 'Reform"' 4 HazardtoConsumers, 56 N.C.L. REv. 677,
690 (1978); Note, supra note 66, at 598.
72. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
73. In one of the latest delayed manifestation injury areas, an increasing number of suits are
being filed for injury from exposure to microwaves that occurred at least a decade prior to the
filing of suiL See, eg., Karras v. General Elec. Corp., No. CV-79-L-20237 (Cook County Cir. Ct.,
1979) (settlement for 13-year exposure to microwaves); Yannon v. New York Tel., N.Y. State
Workers' Compensation Bd., Case 3602 (1980); Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 1, col. 2. Another
delayed manifestation injury on which a class action suit has recently been based is cancer resulting from exposure to newspaper ink. In Hanna v. Sun Chem. Corp., C-81-1697 (N.D. Ohio), the
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non-suiting of hundreds74of thousands of injured plaintiffs cannot fail to influence judicial decisions.
IV.

AVOIDANCE OF THE TIME BAR

Courts faced with plaintiffs whose injuries do not manifest themselves until after the repose period has elapsed can pursue several options to allow
plaintiffs' suits. A few courts have already used some of these options, which
include distinguishing between delayed manifestation and delayed injury (oldproduct) suits, tolling, and declaring the repose statute unconstitutional. The
advantage of the first two options is that delayed manifestation suits may be
prosecuted without directly upsetting legislative judgment in an area in which
wide discretion has traditionally been allowed. 75 While no court has yet distinguished delayed manifestation from delayed injury in avoiding the time
bar, good reasons exist for doing so.
A.

Delayed Manifestationand Delayed Injury

As the liability of manufacturers increased and insurance rates soared,
both manufacturers and insurers tended to focus on the "long-tail" problem as
the primary cause of their ills. 76 Manufacturers viewed the extended potential
liability for old products as making them insurers of their products, and insurers cited that phenomenon as one of the main factors in their inability to predict liability and hold down premiums. "Horror stories" were cited to prove
the point 77 -liability for a 17-year-old bus, 78 a 24-year-old tractor,79 a 30year-old pickling machine. 80 When insurers and business groups went to the
legislators to lobby for change, similar examples of old products causing injury
were used. 8 1 Little attention was paid to injuries that were old by the time
they manifested themselves. Thus, there is little indication that legislators
meant to include delayed manifestation cases within the repose statute's bar.
While the equities involved in old-product injuries and delayed manifesnamed plaintiff, who had worked on newspaper presses for 28 years, sued all companies that
supply Ohio newspapers with ink for his development of cancer of the larynx. At the same time a
suit was filed for the estate of a pressman who died from cancer that affected several organs,
Grady v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. C-81-1696 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
74. See supra note 12.

75. "Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in
logic .... They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between
the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and unavoidable delay.. . . They represent a

public policy about the privilege to litigate. .
314 (1945).

.

...
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,

76. "Long-tail" is a term used to describe the liability of a manufacturer who is potentially

liable for injuries caused by the product as long as the product continues to exist. Of course, the
longer a product is in existence without injuring anyone, the harder it is for a plaintiff to show it

was defective. MODEL UNW. PROD. LiAB. AcT § 110 analysis, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,

62,734 (1979); Johnson, supra note 71, at 691.
77. Johnson,supra note 71, at 679.
78. Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. Ill (D. Md. 1969).
79. Gates v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1974).

80. Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co., 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1972).
81. MODEL UNIF.PROD. LIAB. AcT § 110 analysis,reprintedin44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733.
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tation injuries are similar--"innocent plaintiffs" are barred from suit before
they discover their injury-there are aspects that might have led legislatures to

differentiate. Most old-product injuries involve capital goods in a workplace
situation. Thus, while plaintiffs may be barred from suit against the manufac82
turer, they will still receive payment under workers' compensation plans.
The same is not true for a large proportion of persons injured by products
causing delayed manifestations, 83 such as drugs, radiation, 84 and hazardous
waste. 85 Barring suit against the manufacturer in these cases will bar recovery
altogether.

A similar distinction may also be made based on the type of 15roduct involved. Capital and other long-lived goods very often are sold with an express
warranty that extends beyond the repose period.86 Since almost all the statutes
of repose except express warranties from the repose period, these kinds of suits
would not be barred, and plaintiffs injured by warranted capital goods still
will have an alternative recourse in the courts. 87 Delayed manifestation
claimants will not.
A final distinction concerns the number of plaintiffs barred from remedy.
The number of plaintiffs injured by old products who are barred from suit is
relatively quite small. A study by the Insurance Services Office indicates that
cases based on products over six years old which caused injury are less than
82. The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability and the U.S. Department of Commerce
concluded that workers' compensation should be the sole recovery vehicle for product-related
workplace injuries if additional benefits were included in the compensation plans. The drafters of
the U.P.L.A. concluded, however, that changing the workers' compensation system was beyond
their scope, and they therefore adopted a plan proposed by the American Insurance Association in
their PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 75-76 (1977), which reduced the liability of the

manufacturer by the amount of workers' compensation benefits received by the claimant. See
MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 114(A) analysis, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740.
83. The highest proportion of work-related delayed manifestation injuries currently is from
exposure to asbestos. The recent decision in White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1037 (1982), will allow many plaintiffs to avoid state time bars by bringing
suit under admiralty law and thereby utilizing the time-of-discovery rule.
84. Very few of the personal injury claims resulting from the Three Mile Island accident were
work-related. Jonsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1980). These claimants were denied class
certification and were excluded from a settlement fund of $25 million covering economic losses
and medical checkups. They now must proceed on an individual basis. In re Three Mile Island
Litigation, 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1981). Likewise, the Bikini and Eniwetok Atoll cases do not
involve work-related injuries. See supra note 12.
85. Congress, in the wake of the chemical devestation at Love Canal, ha; passed "superfund"
legislation designed to prevent improper disposal, to clean up sites, and to compensate state and
federal governments for injuries to natural resources. The legislation did not establish a federal
cause of action for personal injury resulting from hazardous waste, however, and litigants will
have to recover by suing in state courts. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
86. Cf.Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1977) (liability for failure of
an 18-year-old laundry machine seal when the normal life expectancy was 30 to 40 years); INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE

LEGAL STUDY 4-5 (1977).
87. See, ag., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1982) (non-oral express warranty); Amiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982). The
U.P.L.A. also exempts express warranties from the application of the Act's repose statute. MODEL
UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 110(B)(2)(a), reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740.
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three percent of litigated claims. 88 The number of delayed manifestation cases
is approaching 100,000 annually and growing yearly as new hazards of "advances in science and technology" are discovered. 89

Whether these differences would have prompted different legislation is
problematic. There are indications that when delayed manifestation problems

were brought to the drafters' attention, some allowance was made. Some legislatures exempted specific delayed manifestation injuries such as asbestiosis

and ionizing radiation injuries from their statute's coverage, 90 and the drafters
of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, who made the most comprehen-

sive study of the situation, exempted delayed manifestation cases altogether. 9'
The drafters of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, after balancing

plaintiffs' and defendants' interests, favored plaintiffs by refusing to adopt a
statute of repose because it "may deprive a person. . . of the right to bring a
92
claim based on a defective product before the injury has actually occurred."

Instead, they substituted a rebuttable presumption that after ten years a product is beyond its useful safe life, and increased the burden of proof necessary
to overcome this presumption. 93 Nevertheless, even after rejecting a statute of

repose the drafters felt delayed manifestation plaintiffs needed further protec94
tion, and exempted them from the coverage of the ten-year presumption.
Thus, under the Model Act delayed manifestation cases would be governed by
the usual time-of-discovery statute of limitations. 95 A few states have also
88. Ins. Servs. Office, N.Y. City, 1976 Products Liability Closed Claim Survey (Dec. 1976)
reported that products over six years old made up only 2.7% of the litigated claims.
89. See supra notes 11-12 & 73. It has been estimated that suits based on the newly discovered delayed injuries from microwaves could be the broadest-based products liability litigation
ever. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 1, col. 2. Suits based on exposure to formaldehyde will further
swell the delayed manifestation suit numbers. Hundreds of suits have been filed, and hundreds
more are expected now that the Consumer Product Safety Commission has banned urea-formaldehyde foam insulation. Natl L.J., May 10, 1982, at 30, col. I.
90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-30 (Supp. 1982) (asbestos); IDAHO CODE § 5-243 (1979) (ionizing radiation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (1980) (asbestos); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 518
(1973) (ionizing radiation). The proposed Ohio product liability reform bill exempted injuries
from exposure to toxic substances because of the delayed manifestation problems. S. 67, 113th
Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 2305.101(A) (Ohio 1979-80). McGovern, supra note 8, at 424.
91. MODEL UNIF. PROD. LiAB. AcT § ll0(B)(2)(d), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
Idaho's Statute, IDAHO CODE § [6-1403(2)(b) 4] 6-1303(2)(b) 4 (Supp. 1982), makes the same
exceptions.
92. MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 110 analysis, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733 (emphasis in original).
93. Id § I 10(B)(l), reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
94. Id § 1 10(B)(2)(d), reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732, provides:
The ten-(10) year period of repose established in Subsection (11)(1) shall not apply if the
harm was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product, or if the injury-causing
aspect of the product that existed at the time of delivery was not discoverable by an
ordinary reasonably prudent person until more than ten(l0) years after the time of delivery, or if the harm, caused within tean(10) years after the time of delivery, did not manifest itself until after that time.
95. Id § 110(C), reprintedin Fed. Reg. at 62,732, specifically provides, "No claim under this
Act may be brought more than two (2) years from the time the claimant discovered, or in the
exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the harm and the cause thereof."
The subsequent analysis states that a discovery approach was adopted so claimants who
"would have no reason to know about the harm or the causal connection to a defective product
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96
adopted the rebuttable presumption approach.

Legislative history is seldom an infallible indication of intent, and speculation about reactions to different kinds and strengths of information is risky
at best. Courts, however, may take cognizance of these differences and, following the lead of the Model Act, find that the statutes should not apply to
delayed manifestation cases. Statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be construed narrowly, 97 and such a construction would be consistent with this
tradition. In addition, courts deluged with thousands of plaintiffs who are denied compensation through no fault of their own are more likely to be influenced by the volume and to make allowances. Once some courts do so, others

will likely follow, especially those that see deference to the legislature as "out
of vogue" and believe that the98idea "that changes should come from the legislature is not in good repute."
B.

Tolling

Another approach the courts could take that would both generally uphold
the repose legislation and allow delayed manifestation suits is the application
of tolling. Tolling of a statutory limitations period has traditionally occurred
to give an injured party a reasonable chance to pursue his or her claim. Limitations periods traditionally have been tolled in cases involving fraudulent
concealment, 99 absence of the defendant from the jurisdiction,10 0 minor or

incompetent plaintiffs,' 0 1 wrongful death,' 0 2 and contribution and indemnity
claims. 10 3 In addition, courts have used time extensions in product liability
cases to avoid nondiscovery statutory time bars by finding continuing duties to
correct or wam, 1°4 by starting accrual for cumulative injuries from multiple
10 6
uses at time of last exposure,10 5 and by recognizing express warranties.
(e.g., the case of long-term pharmaceutical harms)" would not be barred. Id § 110(C) analysis,
reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734.
96. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § [6-1403] 6-1303
(Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.060 (Supp. 1982). See also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5805(9) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
97. Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974); Green v.
State, 257 Ind. 244, 274 N.E.2d 267 (1971).
98. Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690,-, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 135 (1981) (Andreen, J.,
dissenting).
99. See, e.g., Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 315, 114 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1974);
Warington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969).
100. See, e.g, G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 102 S. Ct. 1137 (1982); Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St.
458, 90 N.E. 139 (1950); Vaughn v. Dietz, 430 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1968).
101. See, e.g., Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co., 73 Ill. 2d 58, 382 N.E.2d 784 (1978); Barnette v. Butler
Aviation Int'l, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 350, 391 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1977).
102. See, eg., Deschamps v.. Campdresser & McKee, Inc., 113 N.H. 344, 306 A.2d 771 (1973);
Redick v. Rohm & Haas Co., 97 N.J. Super. 58, 234 A.2d 252 (Law. Div. 1967).
103. See, e.g., United States Lines, v. United States, 470 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1972); Keleket XRay Corp. v. United States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Phillips, An Analysis of ProposedReform ofProducts Liabiliy Statutes of Limitations,56 N.C.L. REv. 663, 671-72 (1978).
104. See, e.g., Boains v. Lasar Mfg. Co., 330 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Conn. 1971); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316, 130 A.2d 793 (1957).
105. See, eg., Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957). The "last exposure"
rule has generally been adopted in an effort to skirt the statute of limitations bar without adopting
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While a few states have specifically included an individual tolling provision in
their product liability reform statutes,10 7 most statutes are silent as to the applicability of these traditional tolling exceptions to their repose periods. Tolling is clearly inconsistent with a firm repose period and would not allow the
actuarial certainty for which the statutes were passed. Yet the notion of equitable tolling is long established. 08 The application of tolling exceptions for
infants and other incompetents, as well as for absence from the jurisdiction
seems likely in the delayed manifestation context. These traditional exceptions will affect few cases and will not unduly upset repose interests.
The United States Supreme Court recently upheld the application of tolling in a product liability suit involving a birth control drug but no delayed
manifestation injury. In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn,' 0 9 plaintiff brought suit
eleven years after suffering a stroke allegedly caused by defendant's contraceptive. Defendant, an out-of-state corporation, was served without problem
a discovery rule. Although the rule in fact provides for a different accrual time, rather than actual
tolling, it does allow for a time extension and has limited application, ai does tolling.
The Virginia Supreme Court recently abandoned the last exposure rule and adopted a semidiscovery rule. In Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981), the court
said that injury was not the broad notion that a person's legally protected interests have been
invaded (last exposure), but a positive physical or mental harm which must be found in the medical evidence. The court noted that this rule was not a discovery rule because that had to be
adopted by the state legislature.
Nebraska recently adopted the last exposure rule to solve the related problem of determining
which of 40 employers should be liable for decedent's peritoneal mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos. Since decedent was employed by the "union hall" method, he worked for many
employers over a period of years. The "last injurious exposure" rule adopted by the court puts
liability for a delayed manifestation occupational disease contracted in the course of successive
employments on the employer who most recently exposed the worker to the harmful substance.
Osteen v. A.C. & S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981).
A similar issue is involved in the dispute between insurance companies regarding the time at
which liability for instance coverage should attach. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have ruled that
liability for coverage of claims by asbestos workers under standard occurrence policies is determined at the time the worker is exposed to asbestos. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d
1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980). The D.C. Circuit, however, expanded the coverage period by ruling coverage is triggered
by exposure to asbestos, exposure in residence as well as by manifestation. Once triggered, the
insurer is liable for the entire loss. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
106. Extension of the time period to the duration of an express warranty is used to prevent
defendant from profiting from its own wrongdoing and is similar to tolling for fraud. See infra
notes 129-31 and accompanying text. The U.P.L.A. exempts application of the 10-year useful safe
life presumption in cases in which a product seller has expressly warranted that the product can be
safely used for more than 10 years. Some states have made similar exceptions. See, e.g, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(d) (West Supp. 1982). In addition, in cases in which a warranty
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods, U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1972) begins accrual of
its 4-year statute of limitations at the time the breach is or should have been discovered.
107. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 6-5-501(2) (West Supp. 1982) (contribution or indemnity); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(d) (West Supp. 1982) (express warranty longer than 10 years or intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.05 1(1) (West 1982) (absence from
the jurisdiction); IDAHO CODE § [6-1403] 6-1303 (Supp. 1982) (fraud); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 13-213(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (incapacity); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(3) (1979) (contribution or indemnity); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §507-D: 2 IV (Supp. 1979) (fraud or written warranty);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980) (minority).
108. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
109. 102 S. Ct. 1137 (1982).
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under New Jersey's long-arm rule. 110 When defendant moved for summary
judgment based on New Jersey's two-year statute of limitations,"' plaintiff
alleged the statute should be tolled because defendant was "not represented"
in New Jersey "by any person or officer upon whom summons or other original process may be served." 112 The Court upheld a New Jersey Supreme
Court finding"1 3 that being amenable to service through a long-arm statute is
not the equivalent of inpersonam service 1 14 and rejected the district court's
reasoning that since the long-arm statute, which made foreign corporations
amenable to service in New Jersey, was passed after the tolling provision, the
tolling provision no longer served a logical purpose and therefore discriminated against unrepresented foreign corporations.1 15 The Court remanded the
case for a determination whether requiring a foreign corporation to register to
do business in New Jersey to avoid tolling, and thereby subjecting the corporation to all duties and liabilities imposed on domestic corporations, is a violation of the commerce clause.
It is not clear that this statute as interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court can survive a commerce clause challenge.1 6 But if it does, and if other
states adopt similar interpretations, courts can avoid statute of limitations bars
in most cases. Thus, the remanded case will play a very important role in
resolving the balance between plaintiffs' right to bring suit and defendants'
repose interests. In any event, the minimal requirements for tolling adopted
by the Court1 17 are likely to encourage other courts to recognize more readily
tolling exceptions in the delayed manifestation context with greater flexibility.
Tennessee's ten-year product liability statute of repose was tolled before
the Cohn decision in a case involving a minor with a delayed manifestation
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

NJ. Civ. P. 4:4-4(c)(1) (1969).
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:14-2 (West 1952).
Id § 2A:14-22.
Velmohos v. Maren Eng'g Corp., 83 N.J. 232, 416 A.2d 372 (1980).
Using a rational standard, the Court found the statute did not violate the equal protection

clause because unrepresented foreign corporations are potentially difficult to locate, and additional conditions must be met for long-arm service. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. at 1142-43. Justice
Stevens, in his dissent, would not have found the statute rational because less restrictive alternatives, such as a longer period of limitations for suits against foreign corporations, or tolling only
for corporations that had not filed their address with the Secretary of State, were possible. Id at
1147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

115. 447 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J. 1978).
116. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235
U.S. 197 (1914). In G.D. Searle & Co. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, dissenting m part,
found that defendants' commerce clause challenge had "considerable force," and would have decided that issue of the case as well. 102 S.Ct. at 1147 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. Besides ignoring the ease with which defendant, and indeed virtually all corporations,
can be served under long-arm statutes, the Court also cited the New Jersey Supreme Court's
laches justification in defense of its finding. The New Jersey Supreme Court said its decision was

not unfair to defendant because if plaintiff inexcusably delayed in bringing suit and thereby
prejudiced defendant, defendant could plead laches. Id at 1144 (citing Velmohos v. Maren Eng'g

Corp., 83 N.J. 282, 293 n.10,416 A.2d 372, 378 n.10 (1980)). As Justice Stevens pointed out, there
are "material differences" between laches and the statute of limitations bar. In the former, plaintiffmust prove inexcusable delay and prejudice, while the latter requires no such proof. 102 S.Ct.
at 1147-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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injury. In Tate v. Eli Lilly & Co. 118 the District Court for the lviddle District
of Tennessee found that the statute, which runs from six years from date of
injury or ten years from the date on which the product was first purchased for
use, except for minors who must bring suit within one year of reaching majority if that occurs sooner, did not bar plaintiff's DES claim.1 19 The court found
that Tennessee had a long-standing policy of protecting the accrued rights of
minors until they reach majority and, therefore, the phrase "whichever occurs
sooner" for minors should have no effect. The majority believed that simple
inadvertence was responsible for the legislature's failure to delete the phrase
during the deliberative process.1 20 A different Tennessee district court, however, refused to allow an adult's DES suit only2 a1 month later, finding the tenyear statutory bar "harsh" but constitutional.
An Illinois appellate court, in deciding a constitutional challenge to the
ten-year statute of repose brought by an eight-year-old boy injured by a product purchased ten years and eleven days before his injury, did not apply tolling.122 Using an approach similar to a rational basis test, the court found the
statute denied neither due process nor the state's guarantee of a remedy for
every wrong. 123 Denial of tolling in such a situation has been interpreted as a
denial of due process by some courts and commentators, and will be discussed
in the next section.' 24 This suit involved a typical delayed injury which was
clearly within the contemplation of the legislature when the statute was
decide the same way if a
passed. x25 It is not clear whether the court 12would
6
delayed manifestation injury were involved.
Tolling exceptions involving fraudulent concealment and continuing duties would have a much greater impact on plaintiffs' ability to bring suit, especially in delayed manifestation cases. Delayed manifestation situations are
particularly amenable to charges of defendant's fraudulent concealment or
failure to warn. Because of the nature of the injury, delayed manifestation
product-related injuries generally involve a time lag between the discovery of
the cause and effect relationship and the general public knowledge of that relationship. 127 Product manufacturers are in the best position to collect data on
118. 522 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).

119.
120.
121.
Oct. 15,
122.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980).
522 F. Supp. at 1050.
Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., [1981] 9 PROD. SAFETY & LAB. REP. (BNA) 875 (E.D. Tenn.
1981).
Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).

123. Id

124. See infra notes 201-38 and accompanying text.
125. Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 111. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).
126. Cf. Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 MI 2d 146, 421 N.E.2d 869 (1981) (discovery
rule applied in delayed manifestation asbestiosis case).
127. See Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977). In DES cases, for

example, it generally is alleged that defendants knew or should have known that DES was both
ineffective and unsafe. Plaintiffs support this allegation by pointing to the fact that by 1947 there
was a substantial body of scientific literature linking the use of hormones to carcinogenic effects,
and there were studies showing that oral administration of DES to laboratory animals produced
cancer. Despite increasing evidence, it was not discontinued as an antiabortion drug until 1971
when the FDA contraindicated its use by pregnant women. Note, supra note 12, at 971 n.25.
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their products' effects and usually have information regarding injuries or the
possibility of injuries before others gain such knowledge. 128 Many of the
delayed manifestation suits, such as those involving DES and asbestos, are
based in part on allegations that defendants knew or should have known that
the product was dangerous, but kept that information from the public and
continued to advertise and market the product or expose people to it.129 Thus,
the seeds of-an estoppel argument are planted in most delayed manifestation
cases.

Courts have consistently applied tolling in fraudulent concealment cases
as an equitable bar to estop a defendant from benefitting from his own wrongdoing. 130 The Supreme Court, recognizing the equitable necessity for such a
bar in a recent discovery-rule case said:
That plaintiff has been injured in fact may be unknown or unknowable until the injury manifests itself; and the facts about causation
may be in the control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the
plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain. The prospect is not so
bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that he has been
has inflicted the injury. He is no longer at the mercy of
hurt and who
13 1
the latter.
In the former case, the Court would begin accrual at the time of discovery, but
not in the latter, when plaintiff is aware of his injury but not of his legal rights.
Other courts have recently expressed similar concerns, and have ruled
132
accordingly.
The same equities are involved in cases alleging continuing duties to
warn, which are increasingly providing a basis for recovery. 133 The Indiana
Supreme Court refused to toll the state's ten-year statute of repose in a chal128. See MODEL UNnF. PROD. LIAB. Acr § 104(C)(6) analysis, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at

62,725.
129. See, e.g., Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177, 179 (7th Cir. 1966); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Johns-

Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1980).
130. See, e.g., Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1969); Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959).
131. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).

132. Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873
(1981); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948,

165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) (allegation of fraudulent concealment sufficient to allow worker to avoid
workers' compensation bar and sue employer for aggravation of asbestiosis). Cf. MODEL UNIF.
PROD. LIa. AcT § 110(B)(2)(b), reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.

133. Increasingly, courts are holding manufacturers liable for failure to warn even when the
likelihood of harm is extremely small. See, e.g., Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana,
S.A., 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978); Graham v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, 8 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB.
REP. (BNA) 415 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975);
Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons, 87 Wis. 2d 882, 275 N.W.2d 915 (1979). These courts consider
warnings to be relatively easy and inexpensive to give, and almost presumptively effective. Therefore, plaintiffs are increasingly using failure to warn, including failure based on postproduction

knowledge, as a backup theory of liability. Cf MODEL UNIIF. PROD. LIAR. AcT § 104(C) analysis,
reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,725.

Failure to carry out a duty to warn based on postproduction knowledge, like postproduction
duties to correct or repair, has served as a basis for extension of the limitations period. Phillips,
supra note 103, at 666-67.

1982]

MANUFACTURERS AND REPOSE STATUTES

lenge based in part on such an argument.1 34 The case, however, did not involve a delayed manifestation injury. Other Indiana courts have indicated
that a delayed manifestation case might lead to different results. 135
In light of today's proconsumer atmosphere and the willingness of courts
to construe limitations statutes to facilitate suits, it is most unlikely that courts
will not apply tolling to estop a defendant from benefitting from its alleged
wrongdoing in delayed manifestation cases. Use of tolling exceptions will enable courts to allow delayed manifestation suits while maintaining the statute's
constitutionality and bar to old-product suits. Nonetheless, the greater the
number of exceptions to the bar that are allowed, the more arbitrary the statute will appear, and its use as a predictor of potential liability will be minimal.
Thus, use of estoppel may prove to be only a temporary measure on the way to
invalidation of product liability statutes of repose.
C

Constitutionality

Constitutional challenges are the most common and comprehensive way
of eliminating strict repose periods. Statutes of repose are increasingly being
overturned on constitutional grounds as courts more closely examine the actual equities involved. At least eleven states have found architects' and builders' repose statutes unconstitutional.1 3 6 A similar number of courts have found
part or all of the medical malpractice reform statutes constitutionally infirm,
and many of these contain repose periods. 137 While a few courts have based
their decisions on equal protection or due process grounds, most have based
them on state constitutional provisions granting access to the courts for redress
of injury or on provisions barring special legislation. 13 8 These provisions protect interests similar to those protected by due process and equal protection
clauses, and courts usually discuss them as if they were interchangeable.' 39
134. The plaintiff in Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., - Ind. -, 418 N.E.2d 207, 212 (1981)
(citing IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-1 (Supp. 1980)), argued that defendant had a continuing duty to
warn users of dangerous features, and that the duty was general and therefore not barred by the
Indiana limitation which was to "govern all product liability actions." (emphasis in original). The
court found that the legislature intended to include negligent failure to warn in the limitation and
that "no cause of action would exist on any such product liability theory after ten years." Id at--,
418 N.E.2d at 212 (emphasis in original). In addition, it found that irrespective of a continuing
duty, the cause of action did not accrue until plaintiff was harmed and that harm occurred after
the statutory period.
135. Cf City ofFt. Wayne v. Cameron, 267 Ind. 329,370 N.E.2d 338 (1977); Alwood v. Davis,
-Ind.

App. -, 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (1980).

136. See supra note 70.
137. Id
138. See, eg., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 IM.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (citing ILL. CONST.
art. IV, § 22: "The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
enumerated cases, that is to say: . . . granting to any corporation, association or individual any
special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever."); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21: "The courts shall be open to
every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay.").
139. See, e.g., Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Bruomo v. Truluck, 270 S.C.
227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d
454 (1975).
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Product liability statutes of repose are subject to challenge on the same
grounds.
1. Equal Protection and Special Legislation
In an equal protection challenge, the classifications made by the legislature must be shown to be reasonably related to the state's objective in order to
be upheld. 4° The reasonableness of the relationship is subject to different
levels of scrutiny-rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny.14 1 The
closer the scrutiny, the less likely the legislation is to be upheld. It is clear that
a strict scrutiny test is not appropriate for statutes of repose because they involve neither suspect classifications nor fundamental rights. 142 Thus, courts
must choose between rationality and the intermediate (close and substantial
relationship) standards when reviewing repose statutes on equal protection
grounds. Courts have invalidated repose statutes under each of these standards in non-product liability cases.
Most courts have used the less demanding rationality standard to test the
architects' and builders' repose statutes, and although most have found the
classifications rationally related to the goal of controlling liability in the construction industry and thereby alleviating the "crisis," an increasing number
are not so finding.1 43 Like statutes of repose for manufacturers and sellers of
products, architects' and builders' statutes of repose were passed to solve a
perceived crisis in the industry caused by changing laws and expanded liability. 144 Although coverage of the architects' and builders' statutes is not uniform, most apply only to contractors, builders, architects, and similar groups
involved in the construction process, but not to groups such as owners and
material suppliers who also face significant liability. 45 It is this limited coverage that has proved fatal under special legislation and equal protection challenges. 46 Following the lead of the "seminal" decision of Skinner v.
140. See, ag., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611
P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980); Nowack, Realigning the Standards ofReview Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited,
Neutral,and Permissive Classjcations, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1073 (1974).
141. See Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 25-37 (1972).
142. See, ag., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954) (race); McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1344
(1980) (no suspect classification present; strict scrutiny test not applied).
143. See supra note 70.
144. In the 1960s the protection for architects and builders under the privity doctrine was
withdrawn, subjebting them to liability to third-party suits. The increased liability was not only in
numbers of potential suits, but also for greater spans of time. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark.
1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appealdismissed,401 U.S. 901 (1971); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 1979); Comment, Limitation ofAction Statutesfor Architects and
Builders-Blueprintsfor Non-action, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 361, 363 (1969).
145. Comment, Limitation ofAction Statutesfor Architects and Builders-Blueprints for Non.
action, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 361, 365 (1969).

146. See, ag., Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 194 Minn. 97, 260 N.W.2d 548 (1977); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square
D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 824
(Wyo. 1980). See also Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316,343 N.E.2d 832 (C.P. Cuyahoga
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Andersen,1 47 courts, in overturning the statutes, have found no rational reason
why only certain groups should
be singled out for protection from all those
14 8
who are potentially liable.
A similar challenge may be made to the product liability statutes of repose: they protect only some of the persons or groups potentially liable in a
product liability suit. Owners of products or premises where injuries occur are
149
not specifically granted the immunity given to manufacturers and sellers.
Nevertheless, this denial of equal protection argument is less persuasive for
the product liability statutes because these statutes protect a greater number
and wider class of potential defendants, or simply bar most actions based on
product injury no matter who the defendant may be.150 Because of this wider
coverage and inclusion of groups most likely to be defendants and most involved in the crisis, courts are more likely to find the legislation rationally
related to the goal of reducing insurance rates by limiting liability. At least
one court has so held in an old-product injury suit.15 1 An argument based on
denial of equal protection to manufacturers of short-lived as opposed to longunlikely to be successful when examined on a rational
lived products is also
152
relationship basis.
An equal protection argument potentially more appealing to today's
courts in the product liability setting is based on the denial of equal protection
to plaintiffs. Persons whose injuries do not manifest themselves until after the
running of the statutory period are denied the protection accorded to plaintiffs
whose injuries are readily apparent soon after the product is used. Similarly,
persons injured by older products do not receive the same protection as those
injured by newer ones. Even though these classifications may not be seen as
irrational, they are likely to be overturned if an intermediate standard is
3
used.t5
County 1976) (court drew distinctions between medical malpractice defendants and other tort
defendants in finding the statute violative of equal protection).
147. 38 I. 2d 455,231 N.E.2d 588 (1967), citedin Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821,
825 (Wyo. 1980).

148. See supra cases at note 146.
149. Vargo & Liebman, ProductsLiability, Survey of Recent Developments in IndianaLaw, 12
IND. L. Rav. 227, 252 (1979).

150. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § [6-1403] 6-1303 (Supp.
1982); IND. CODE ANN. § [34-4-20A-1] 33-1-1.5-1 (Bums Supp. 1982); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224

(1979); N.H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 507-D: 1 (Supp. 1979); OF. REv. STAT. § 30.900 (1981); I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-13 (Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980). But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982)

(limited to strict liability in tort).
151. In Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ind. 1980), the court rejected
plaintiff's equal protection argument based on denial of protection to third-party owners of products, finding plaintiff's argument tenuous at best. The majority found the legislation was reasonably related to the goal of making insurance available, which also served the broad public purpose

of providing a source of funds for recovery that might not otherwise be available. It also ultimately reduced the product cost to the public by holding down the seller's business costs. Id at
25.
152. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
153. Cf. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 1979) (architects and
builders statute overturned); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (middle standard used to invalidate medical malpractice statute).
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While no one disputes the legislature's right to make distinctions, the classifications must not be arbitrary. Under a mere rationality standard there is
evidence that a repose period which cuts off a plaintiff's right to sue for oldproduct injuries after ten years is not arbitrary. 154 The legislature has chosen a
time period during which almost all evident product injuries occur. 155 The
assumption behind choosing a fairly long period is that if a product functions
safely for a number of years, it may be assumed to be nondefective, and if it
causes injury after that time, the injury probably occurred for some reason
unrelated to defect, such as product misuse, alteration, or use beyond the
product's reasonable safe life.' 5 6 Thus, while a more rational distinction could
have been made-for example, setting different periods for short-lived and
long-lived capital goods-no reasonable period would have been perfect, and
some repose was considered necessary to stabilize insurance rates and therefore to help ease the crisis. 157 If some cutoff period is acceptable, one that
allows a fairly long time for a product to manifest defects and allows for inclusion of almost all old-product suits is likely to meet the minimum rationality
test. 158
Delayed manifestation equal protection challenges might be more successful because a much larger number of these cases are excluded by the statutes, and the courts and legislatures traditionally have seen greater inequities
in not allowing suit for someone who is injured and does not know it. 15 9 In
addition, precedent exists under the medical malpractice statutes of repose for
disallowing such distinctions. Delayed manifestation injury cases are similar
to delayed discovery of foreign object cases in medical malpractice. 160 The
latter were generally exempted from inclusion in the statutes of repose passed
154. A majority of states with repose statutes have selected 10 years as the appropriate period.
See, eg., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(c) (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp.
1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (1982); IDAHO CODE § [6-1403] 6-1303 (Supp. 1982); NED,
REV. STAT. § 25-224(2) (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28103 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977). The periods range from a low of six years, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1982), to a high

of twelve years. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031 (West 1982);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5805(9) (Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D (Supp. 1979).
Most states commence the period from date of sale to the consumer; some states, however,
measure it from the time of manufacture. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (Cum. Supp. 1981)
(date of sale to consumer); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977) (six years from sale to consumer
or ten years from date of manufacture).
155. See supra note 88.
156. MODEL UNIr. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 110 analysis, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734. Some
states, following the U.P.L.A., have used this assumption to set a rebuttable presumption of
nondefectiveness rather than setting a repose period. 'See,e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3)
(Supp. 1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §411.310(1) (Baldwin 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.060 (Supp. 1982).
157. Cq ALA. CODE § 6-5-500 (Supp. 1981) (intent of legislature; legislative findings); Dague
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19, 25 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
158. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. at 25.
159. See supra notes 18-41 and accompanying text. Legislative accommodation to this problem can be seen in some of the product liability reform statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(b)
(Supp. 1982) (discovery rule for latent or delayed manifestation instead of one year.statute of
limitations).
160. Birnbaum, supra note 28, at 289.
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to protect health care providers, and a discovery statute of limitations was
maintained for them.' 6 1 There is little rational reason to deny suit to delayed

manifestation plaintiffs, whose injuries are often deadly or life-threatening and
debilitating, while allowing suit to plaintiffs injured by doctors and other
health care providers who have left foreign objects in their bodies. Both the
medical malpractice and product liability statutes were passed to solve an economic crisis, 162 and that solution will not be helped by allowing suit in one
case but not the other.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court, which recently overturned a medical malpractice statute of repose in Carson v. Maurer,163 used a middle stan-

dard of review to find that distinctions made on the basis of delayed discovery
due to hidden injuries were unconstitutional. One provision of New Hamp-

shire's medical malpractice act reduced the statute of limitations from six to
two years, and started it running from the commission of the act, not discovery, unless suit was based on the discovery of a foreign object in the body. 164
In the latter instance, suit had to be commenced within two years of the time
of discovery. The act also abolished the tolling of the statute for infants and
incompetents. 1 65 The court found the legislature could not abolish the discov-

ery rule for just one class of medical malpractice plaintiffs, nor could it penalize infants and incompetents in relation to their kind under nonmalpractice
circumstances.1 66 Other courts have indicated a willingness to adopt similar
holdings.

167

The court in Carson used an intermediate standard of review in examin-

ing the constitutionality of the statute.' 68 In so doing it followed several other
courts that have used this stricter standard to find the medical malpractice acts

unconstitutional.' 69 The use of this middle tier approach would be equally
appropriate in examining product liability statutes of repose.
It is fitting to use a heightened review for this type of legislation for several reasons. Unlike traditional statutes of limitations which set procedural

161. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-105(l)(a) (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(9)
(Cum. Supp. 1981).
162. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Refornr A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REv. 489
(1977); Massery, supra note 7; Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical MalpracticeInsurance
Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759 (1977); Note, supra note 7.
163. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
164. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:5 (Supp. 1979).
165. "A minor under the age of 8 years at the time of the act, omission or failure complained
of shall in any event have until his tenth birthday in which to commence an action." Id
166. 120 N.H. at 936-37, 424 A.2d at 833-34.
167. See, e.g., Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., - Ind. App. -, 426 N.E.2d 422 (1981); Alwood v. Davis, -Ind. App. -, -411 N.E.2d 759,761 (1980); State v. Wilson, No. 74-329 (Mont.
Aug. 4, 1981).
168. "IT]he classifications. .. 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.
120 N.H. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830-31.
169. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980). Cf.
Muzar v. Metro Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d 850 (1978) (architects' and
builders' statute of repose case).
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duties, statutes of repose extinguish substantive rights by denying a duty of
care from manufacturers to consumers. 170 This removal of substantive rights,
which affects thousands of plaintiffs injured by widely used products, requires
more careful scrutiny than that accorded procedural changes. Moreover, in
these instances the heightened review becomes even more compelling because
of the aura of special legislation. The repose statutes were brought to the legislators and supported by a lobby of the very groups they were intended to protect. 17 1 These are groups that wield considerable power, money, and influence
and can therefore exert considerable pressure on the lawmakers. Those injured by the special legislation had no such power or influence to act as a
counterbalance, and no unified voice to represent them. The legislation was
presented in a "crisis" atmosphere in which quick solutions rather than careful
172
It is
examination of actual facts and figures were the order of the day.

precisely in this type of situation, in which it is clear that both sides were not
adequately represented and that the substantive rights of the under-represented group were harmed, that the middle review is appropriate.
Use of such a standard comports with the views of modem constitutional
writers who predicted and called for greater use of a stricter standard in a
wider variety of cases over a decade ago. Professor Gunther foresaw the increased use of closer scrutiny in a wider range of cases in which interests were
not adequately represented. 173 More recently, Professors Nowak and Ely
have urged more careful review of issues involving equal protection. 174 Ely,
whose book Democracy and Distust 175 has sparked considerable discussion

and debate, 176 divides provisions of the Constitution into two groups: (1) mandates from the Framers requiring certain actions, and (2) provisions that are
open-ended statements of ideals whose substance is to be filled in subsequently
by courts. The equal protection clause belongs to the latter group.177 In setting the parameters of equal protection and in reviewing legislation in light of
them, courts are to be guided by the notion that broad participation in the
processes and distributions of a representative democracy, rather than individual notions of fairness and due process, is the crucial goal. 17 8 The issues involved in these statutes of repose do not rise to the blockage of participation in
democracy as does the denial of voting privileges, nor do they involve a dis170. Massery, supra note 7; Witherspoon, Constitutionalityof/he Texas Statute Limiting Liablityfor Medical Maipracice, 10 Tax. TECH. L. REV. 419, 454-55 (1979).
171.

PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE: STATUTES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE

FAIRNESS AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW (American Ins. Ass'n
supra note 7.

1977). See

172. Johnson, supra note 71, at 678; Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 10, at 222-23.
173. Gunther, supra note 141. Cf. Dike v. School Bd. of Orange County, 650 F.2d 783 (5th
Cir. 1981) (right to breastfeed).
174. Nowak, supra note 140; Ely, Constitutionallnterpretivism:Its Allure andImpossibility, 53
IND. L.J. 399 (1978).
175. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISmUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

176. See, e g., Alexander, Modem EqualProtectionTheories: A MetatheoreticalTaxonomy and
Critique,42 OHIO ST. .J.3 (1981); Berger, E0y), "Theory ofJudicialReview," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87
(1981).
177. J. ELY, supra note 175, at 119-24.

178. Id
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crete and insular minority requiring substantial constitutional protection.
They do, however, call for greater scrutiny than mere rationality because of
the lack of participation and power of the harmed group and the importance
1 79
of the right denied.
Courts have used this middle standard when reviewing statutes denying
compensation for bodily injury in non-product liability contexts. In Hunter v.
North Mason School District18 0 for example, the Washington Supreme Court
found that a statute which limited plaintiff's right to bring suit against the
government by requiring formal notice of the claim within 120 days' 8 1 placed
a "substantial burden" on a "substantial property right . . . in many cases
fundamental to the injured person's physical well-being and ability to live a
decent life."' 8 2 Since most tort victims did not know of the notice requirement, suit against the government in most instances was barred, while tort
victims of nongovernmental defendants were allowed three years within which
to bring suit. Such a distinction, when tested by a middle standard of review
because of the "substantial" importance of the right,' 8 3 denied equal protection. The same reasoning has been applied in the medical malpractice context. The court in Carson v. Maurer, in fact, cited Hunter as primary support
for its holding that barriers put in the way of a medical malpractice victim's
ability to bring suit affected an important substantive right and therefore
should be judged by the use of the middle standard.1 4 Courts in other contexts have similarly used a more than mere rationality test when barriers to the
right to bring suit were involved.' 8 5 The same reasoning is applicable to denial of compensation for bodily injury caused by products.
Once a stricter, middle standard is used, it is appropriate for courts to
examine whether a crisis actually exists and, if so, whether the legislation will
alleviate that crisis.18 6 It is appropriate to question both the existence of the
crisis and the extent to which increases in awards contributed to that crisis,
because without a crisis the classification would neither serve an important
governmental end nor could its alleviation be substantially achieved. In the
delayed manifestation situation, the answer to both these questions appears to
to
be no. As in the medical malpractice area, writers and courts are beginning
87
discover that the crisis may have been more perceived than real.'
Over five years ago, after extensive study of the problem, the Interagency
179. Cf.id at 73-104; Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
LJ.920, 934 (1973).
180. 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
181. WASH. REV.CODE ANN. § 4.96.020 (Supp. 1982).
182. 85 Wash. 2d at 814, 539 P.2d at 847-48.
183. See supra note 169.
184. 120 N.H. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830.
185. See, eg., Muzar v. Metro Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d 850 (1978)
(architects' and builders' statute of repose). Cf.Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106
Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (guest statute).
186. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,424 A.2d 825 (1980); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385,
421 A.2d 190 (1980); Redish, supra note 162, at 772.
187. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 872, 555 P.2d 399, 412 (1976); T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INsURANCE: A LEGIsLAToR's ViEw (1978); Note, Which Equal
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Task Force on Product Liability concluded that the crisis may be more
imagined than real, that the open-ended problem was not very significant, and
that insurance rates were not necessarily responsive to actual liabilities.188 As
stated in the Analysis to the proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act,
"The limited available data show that insurers' apprehensions about older
products may be exaggerated."' 18 9 Over ninety-seven percent of product-re-

lated accidents occurred within six years of product purchase, 190 and the problem caused by the few old-product cases that were successfully prosecuted was

never adequately documented.' 9 1 There was little evidence to support the
claim that businesses were being forced to close because of the jump in rates.
Recent evidence indicates that plaintiffs are not particularly more successful in
prosecuting claims than they were several years ago.' 92 Old-product claims
are especially difficult for plaintiffs because the older the product, the heavier
the burden on the plaintiff to overcome the natural assumption that a product
in use without incident for a long period of time was not defective.' 93 As one
horror stories" drove rates up because rates are
commentator put it, a "few194
based on subjective factors.

In the great majority of cases insurance companies did not rely on actual
product liability data when increasing premiums.' 95 Because product liability
coverage was part of a comprehensive general liability package, the claim payout ratio for product liability injuries could not be determined, and the subjective loss estimates that form the basis of premium settings were even more
subjective in the product liability area.1 96 States recently have taken this sub-

jective factor into account when considering product liability reform.' 97 The
Protection Standardfor Medical MalpracticeLegislation?, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 125, 127-30
(1980).
Insurance industry representatives, testifying in 1975, stated that unavailability of insurance
because of price increases was a problem in only nine states. FederalMedicalMalpracticeInsuranceAct, 1975. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Healthof the Senate Comm. on LaborandFublc
Welfare, 94th Cong., IstSess. (Apr. 7-15, 1975). By 1977 rates were being reduced in some of
those states. Witherspoon, supra note 170, at 447 n.126.1.
188. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD. LIAB., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BRIEFING REPORT ii, 40 (1977).
189. MODEL UNI'. PROD. LiAB. ACT § 110 analysis, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733.
190. Id
191. Massery, supra note 7, at 542; Phillips, supra note 103, at 664; Begam, One Maore Insurance 'Crisis,' TRIAL MAG., Nov. 1976, at 46, 49.
192. NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUB. INTERESTS, supra note 5, at 4. A REPORT OF
THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE (Report 25,

1976), citedin Massery, supra note 7, at 544 n.52, showed that of the cases which went to trial, only
28% resulted in verdicts in favor of plaintiffs. A recent report of the Rand Corporation's Institute
for Civil Justice indicates the median amount of jury awards is declining. Median Civil Jury
4ward.Declines, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
193. See Kiusis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321,332, 319 A.2d 914, 921 (1974);
MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 110 analysis, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734; Prosser, The
Fall fthe Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 844-45 (1966).
194. Johnson, supra note 71, at 679.
195. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD. LIAB., supra note 2, at 1-22.
196. Id at 1-23 to -24.
197. Ohio, for example, in its 1980 proposed liability act, devoted a substantial portion of the
bill to sections requiring insurance companies to report the data upon which premiums are based
and requiring that rates be based upon actual stated expenditures. S. 67, 113th Gen. Assembly,
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pattern of the subjective nature of rate setting and the artificial creation of a
crisis atmosphere, which has been well documented in the medical malpractice
field, 198 is emerging in the products liability area as a key cause of the highly
increased premiums.
In addition, even if there were a crisis, it is far from clear that the repose
statutes would alleviate it. Since most product manufacturers and product liability insurers operate on a multistate basis, anything short of a nationwide
repose period would do little to alleviate the problem of open-ended liability
because premiums are calculated on the experience in all relevant states.' 99 If,
as has been suggested, the rates are more the result of economic fluctuations
and unsuccessful investment practices than realistic liability predictions, requirements that premiums be well documented and based on actual state in20 0
surance claims would be far more useful and equitable.
As in the medical malpractice challenges, use of a middle standard of
review is likely to result in overturning the product liability statutes of repose
on equal protection and special legislation grounds.
2. Due Process and Guaranteed Access to the Courts
Courts have also begun to take a closer look at repose statutes when evaluating their validity on grounds of due process and guaranteed access to the
courts. Product liability statutes of repose that have been declared unconstitutional were overturned primarily on this latter ground. The Florida Supreme
Court, in a 4-3 decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co. ,201
declared the Florida product liability statute of repose to be in violation of the
state constitution. The basis for this finding was an earlier decision, Overland
Construction Company v. Simmons, 20 2 which invalidated the Florida repose
statute for architects and builders because it was in violation of the Florida
203
constitutional provision granting access to the courts for redress of injury.
The Overland court interpreted this provision to mean that a common-law
right cannot be taken away unless the legislature "has shown an overpowering
public necessity for this prohibitory provision, and an absence of less onerous
alternatives. ''2° 4 The court found that the legislature had not expressed such a
necessity, and the court could not find one in the changed circumstances which
led to increased liability.205 In addition, the problems of reliable evidence and
changes in technology were no different than those faced by all litigants, and
Reg. Sess. .§§ 3929.301, 3937.021 (Ohio 1979-80). In addition § 3937.021 would have created a
commission designed to study the impact of the reform legislation on product liability law in Ohio
and to make recommendations to the legislature regarding revisions.
198. Seesupra note 187.
199. Phillips, supra note 103, at 672.
200. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD. LIAB., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, , III FINAL
REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 131-32 (1977).
201. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980).
202. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
203. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
204. 369 So. 2d at 574.

205. Id
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there was not sufficient reason to protect the construction industry at the expense of the injured plaintiff.2°6 The court did not discuss less onerous alternatives, but in a product liability setting, measures such as different repose
periods for different kinds of goods, 20 7 rebuttable presumptions of nondefectiveness, 20 8 and closer monitoring of the setting of premiums are well
recognized.
In a subsequent decision the Florida court, with only one dissent, affirmed
its finding of unconstitutionality of the product liability statute of repose in a
delayed manifestation case. Plaintiff in Diamond v. E.A Squibb & Sons,
Inc.209 suffered injury from DES, but the injury did not manifest itself until
twenty years after her mother's ingestion of the drug. The differences between
two of the
delayed manifestation and old-product injury cases persuaded
2 10
judges who dissented in Battilla to change their opinions.
States that have held architect and builder repose statutes unconstitutional may also overturn their product liability statute of repose. 2 1' In Bolick
v. American Barmag Corp.,212 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently
used its state constitutional provision guaranteeing legal remedy for injury
2 14
done2 13 to declare that state's six-year product liability statute of repose
unconstitutional.2 1 5 While recognizing that legislatures have the power to set
limitation periods, the court found that this statute was not one of limitation
because it cut off claims before they could accrue. This bar to the seeking of
redress before the right arose violated the constitutional guarantee of remedy.2 16 The court cited the Florida and Kentucky decisions as well as other
states' decisions overturning architects' and builders' statutes. 2 17 Unlike Florhowever, North Carolina had not previously overturned a
ida and Kentucky,
218
repose statute.
206. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida recently reached the same
conclusion in Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 521 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1981).

207. Note, supra note 6, at 713-14.
208. See supra note 156.
209. 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
210. 1d at 672.
211. See, ag., Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611

P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980). Wisconsin interpreted a similar constitutional provision on equal protection grounds. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
212. 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981). See also Survey of Recent Developments-Con.
stitutional Law, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1272, 1285 (1981).
213. N.C. CONsT. art. r, § 18.
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1981).

215. 54 N.C. App. at 595, 284 S.E.2d at 192.
216. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18.

217. 54 N.C. App. at 593, 284 S.E.2d at 191.
218. North Carolina courts had interpreted the state's earlier statute of repose (N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 1-15(b) (Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979)) to apply only to cases in which injury was not
readily apparent. They were thus able to avoid most of the hardships caused by the lack of a
discovery rule. Raftery v. William C. Vick Constr. Co., 291 N.C. 180, 230 S.E.2d 405 (1976). The

passage of the 1979 statute was designed to reverse this interpretation. Special Project, The Counof the ConstitutionalityofStatutes of Repose
terattack to Retake the CitadelContinues.'
449, 465 (1981).
& Com. nAnalysis
in ProductsLiability, 46 J. AiR L.
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In Thorton v. Mono ManufacturingCo. 219 Illinois also recognized that the
state's ten-year limitation statute was not a true statute of limitations but a law
extinguishing a right of action.220 Nevertheless, the Illinois Appellate Court
did not find the statute to be in violation either of due process or the state
constitution's guarantee of a judicial remedy for every wrong.2 21 The court
distinguished its constitutional provision from Florida's by stating that in Illinois the access principle was merely a philosophy, whereas the Florida court
had interpreted the provision as granting vested rights in certain remedies
which could be abrogated only by showing overpowering public necessity and
absence of less onerous alternatives. 222 The Illinois statute, however, applies
only to strict liability actions. 223 Thus, plaintiff is not foreclosed from suit but
merely from one theory. Indiana has also upheld its statute against attack
based in part on the state constitutional provision granting legal remedy for
224

injury.

It is not clear at this point whether many other courts are likely to adopt
this due process/access-to-courts reasoning. Most of the challenges to the architects' and builders' repose statutes, both successful and unsuccessful, were
based on equal protection clauses. More recently, however, in the medical
malpractice area, several courts have overturned reform statutes on the ground
that they limit access to the courts.22 5 Although these decisions have focused
on the statutes' requirement of use of medical malpractice panels, 226 they indicate a greater willingness to review closely legislation on court access/due process grounds. Again, it is the judicial willingness to engage in close review that
will be the key.
It is well recognized that constitutional provisions requiring remedy by
due course of law are not blanket guarantees. 227 Not every injury is remedied.
And even for those that have been remedied in the past, legislatures may modify the law to reflect changing realities.228 Most states have found that rights
which are not fundamental and have not vested can be rationally created or
219. 99 IM.App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).
220. Id at 726-27, 425 N.E.2d at 525.
221. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
222. 54 IM.App. 3d at 727-28, 425 N.E.2d at 525-26.
223. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13.213(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
224. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
225. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Mll.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976);
State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.
1979) (en banc); Parker v. Children's Hasp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
226. See, eg., Caldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon
Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (en bane); Mattos v.
Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
227. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19, 25-26 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
228. [No one has a vested interest in any rule of the common law. Rights of property
which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process;

but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, within constitutional limits, may be changed at
the will of the legislature. The great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common

law as they develop, and to adopt it to the change of time and circumstance.

Gallegner v. Davis, 183 A. 620, 624 (DeL Super. Ct. 1936). See also Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117

(1929).
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abrogated at the legislatures' will. 229 Changing the time period in which suit
can be brought (a time period that comports with earlier statutes of limitations
interpretations) to solve a perceived economic crisis while allowing the majority of suits has been found to comport with this legislative right. 230 But the
denial of rights to thousands of plaintiffs in delayed manifestation suits may
cause the courts to require either an23 "overpowering public necessity" or a
showing of less onerous alternatives. 1
A further distinction based on delayed manifestation injuries is possible.
Due process challenges to statutes of repose primarily have been based on the
argument that the legislature cannot take away a right without providing a
reasonable alternative. 232 In tort, however, there is no cause of action and
therefore no vested property right upon which to base a due process challenge,
until injury occurs. Therefore, an injury occurring after the running of the
statutory period, such as an injury from old products, is not entitled to due
process protection. 233 Delayed manifestation suits, however, present a slightly
different problem. In these cases injury often occurs within the statutory period; plaintiff is just unaware of its existence. Thus, in these cases a challenge
to the statutes may rest upon a theoretical basis entirely distinct from the more
traditional challenges. 234 These cases are similar to those that involve denial
of tolling of the statute for children and incompetents. 235 Traditionally, statutes of limitations were tolled for these groups until they reached majority or
regained competency in order to allow them full cognizance of their injuries
and adequate time to pursue legal remedies. Denying tolling of the period
until awareness of injury occurs is arguably a denial of due process because it
denies reasonable access to the courts without providing adequate alternatives. 236 The same may be said of repose statutes in delayed manifestation
cases.

Two other potential due process problems exist for some statutes that do
not provide for a grace period at the end of the statutory period or between the
former law and the new repose period. Since the legislature may modify a
vested right only if it provides a reasonable alternative, the new statutes must
allow a grace period during which suits that would not be barred under the
former law can be brought before being barred by the new period.237 Likewise, if no provision is made for persons who are injured near the end of the
229. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978); Sidle v.
Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976).
230. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19, 25 (N.D. Ind. 1980).

231. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1979) (citing Kluger v. White,
281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)).
232. See, e.g., Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104,551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosenberg v. Town
of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
233. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. at 23; Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen,
61 NJ. at 199, 293 A.2d at 666-67.
234. See Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., - Ind. _ 406 N.E.2d 1239 (1980).
235. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § [34-4-20A-5] 33-1-1.5-5 (Bums Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.1-02(2) (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(2) (1977).
236. Massery, supra note 7, at 548.
237. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (1979); S.D. CODED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp.
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repose period, such as incorporating the usual two-year statute of limitations
so a reasonable time is provided during which to bring suit, the statute may be
violative of due process. 238 These due process problems, while individually
important, are easily remedied without changing the definite cutoff date for
the vast majority of plaintiffs, and will therefore probably have little impact.
V.

SUMMARY

Product liability statutes of repose were passed in a "crisis" atmosphere to
help swing the pendulum away from what manufacturers and insurers saw as
an extremely proplaintiff position. Generally, the language of the statutes is
unequivocal and would seem to indicate a legislative intent to cut off liability
after a specific number of years. The legislative preference for repose in order
to maintain a healthy business atmosphere is clear. If strictly interpreted, the
statutes will bar thousands of suits in which injured plaintiffs, through no fault
of their own, do not discover their injuries until after the statutory period has
run. To be sure, barring such suits would be consistent with repose interests
and a legislative desire to limit liability and thereby promote a probusiness
climate. Nonetheless, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the
loss-spreading and safety-promoting policies currently fostered by courts in a
wide variety of decisions. An absolute time bar provides little incentive to
produce safe, long-lasting products, and may lead to practices such as dumping potentially dangerous products in states that have repose statutes and establishing long shelf lives before sale.
Courts are being asked to review these statutes, and except for those
courts that give extreme deference to legislative judgment, they are not likely
to find the statutes as unequivocal as had been assumed, especially when statutes are challenged in delayed manifestation cases. The climate of crisis has
passed. Courts reviewing the legislation in this calmer atmosphere will probably. see less reason to protect insurance companies and businesses at the expense of plaintiffs' substantive rights, particularly in light of the evidence
indicating these groups were at least in part responsible for the "crisis" and
possessed the influence to have legislation passed to protect themselves. Precedents set in cases construing repose statutes that protect health practitioners
and architects and builders will likely be used by many courts to invalidate the
product liability statutes on constitutional grounds. Two state courts have already done so. Other jurisdictions may take a less sweeping approach by applying time extensions such as tolling or by upholding the repose statutes but
finding that they apply only to old-product injury cases.
In our litigious society, courts are increasingly asked to provide antidotes
to modem social problems. 239 Delayed manifestation injuries caused by tech1982). Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978); Balzer v. Inland Steel Co., 100
Ill. App. 3d 1071, 427 N.E.2d 999 (1981).
238. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN.

§ [34-4-20A-5] 33-1-1.5-5 (Bums Supp. 1982).
239. J. LIEBERMAN, THE LrrIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981).
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nological innovation are prime examples of such problems. Little has been
done so far by legislatures to deal comprehensively with these technological
effects. 240 Until such responsible action is taken, courts are likely to review
legislation closely.
Many preferable legislative responses could have been made: closer regulation of rate setting, rebuttable presumptions of nondefectiveness, different
periods of repose for different types of goods, and so on. Since legislatures did
not choose one of these less restrictive alternatives, many courts are likely to
ameliorate the statutes' harsh effects by opting to protect the rights of the
delayed manifestation plaintiffs.

240. One example of a more comprehensive legislative approach is the Superfund Section
301(c) Study, which is empowered to study the rights of individuals injured by chemicals, whether
the tort system is adequate to cover them, and possible changes that should be made. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(Supp. IV 1980).

